Check for updates

Data Feature

cmps

Conflict Management and Peace Science
2016, Vol. 33(2) 198–223
© The Author(s) 2015
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0738894215572757
cmp.sagepub.com
SAGE

Conflict management capabilities of peace-brokering international organizations, 1945–2010: A new dataset

Magnus Lundgren
Stockholm University, Sweden

Abstract
The expectation that international organizations (IOs) can play a role in the resolution of violent conflict has spawned a process of institutional growth in the post-Second World War period. IOs at all levels have expanded existing instruments of conflict management and have gradually established new ones, such as mediation support units, early warning systems and standby military forces. Empirical research on this process has suffered from a lack of systematic, cross-temporal data. Seeking to rectify this weakness, this article introduces an original dataset on the institutional design of 21 peace-brokering IOs, organizations endowed with standing capabilities for conflict management interventions. The dataset contains yearly observations on 14 institutional variables during the 1945–2010 period, centered around three instruments of IO conflict management: mediation, economic sanctions and peacekeeping. It also includes observations on IO membership characteristics, power polarity and a set of security-related institutional features. This dataset provides scholars with a new source of variables for the study of institutional evolution, institutional heterogeneity and the impact of institutional characteristics on IO performance. A preliminary descriptive analysis shows that IOs display significant variation in terms of mandates, capabilities and rates of change. Using the data, I also perform a re-appraisal of an earlier study on IO dispute resolution, demonstrating the analytic benefits of having disaggregated measures of institutional design.

Keywords
Capabilities, conflict management, dataset, institutional design, international organizations

Introduction

This paper introduces the International Organizations Conflict Management (IOCM) dataset.[1] The data has been gathered in response to an increasing activity by international organizations (IOs) in the management of inter- and intrastate military disputes,[2] with a

Corresponding author:
Magnus Lundgren, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, 10691 Stockholm, Sweden.
Email: magnus.lundgren@statsvet.su.se

concomitant proliferation of IO intervention capabilities, geared towards mediation, economic sanctions and peacekeeping. Capturing institutional heterogeneity, across IOs and across time, is a key rationale behind the data.

It has been a dominant, if implicit, assumption in international relations that we can study IOs as uniform actors with uniform effects. This holds for realists, dismissing IOs as epiphenomenal (Mearsheimer, 1994; Waltz, 1979), for the liberal counterargument (Doyle, 2005; Oneal and Russett, 1999) and for much large-*N* work on IOs in conflict studies (Wallace and Singer, 1970). However, IOs are not all alike. Neither do they remain static over time. For example, while both the United Nations (UN) and the Arab League (LAS) aspire to provide conflict resolution, the instruments available to them, and the manner in which these instruments are authorized, vary dramatically between the two organizations. The UN is equipped with a wide range of tools for conflict management, some of which have been fully delegated to a standing international bureaucracy, the UN Secretariat. The UN is equally engaged with intrastate disputes, or civil wars, as it is with interstate disputes. In comparison, the Arab League has fewer instruments, remains focused on interstate disputes and has severely constrained independence vis-à-vis its member states. Similar variation can be found across time: 50 years ago, the UN was more like the LAS is today, but it has subsequently changed, through a process of institutional evolution, to become a more equipped and more independent actor, whereas the LAS has changed very little.

Only by capturing institutional variation across IOs and time can we hope to develop accurate theories of their impact on war and peace. Fortunately, a line of research emphasizing the utility of disaggregating international institutions (Koremenos et al., 2001; Martin, 1992) has progressively found its way into the literature on IO conflict management, as illustrated by works by Boehmer et al. (2004), Haftel (2007, 2012) and Hansen et al. (2008), which offer valuable insights into how we can measure institutional variation.

However, existing IO data sources do not capture the full repertoire of instruments used in contemporary IO conflict management, often lack time-sensitive observations and remain focused on interstate disputes, notwithstanding that the great majority of contemporary wars are civil wars. The IOCM dataset addresses these three limitations. It includes variables that cover all key instruments employed by contemporary IOs. It is sensitive to IOs changing over time and it emphasizes capabilities relevant for the management of intrastate disputes.

The IOCM dataset tracks 21 peace-brokering IOs, intergovernmental organizations endowed with standing, specialized instruments for conflict management interventions, with yearly observations on 14 institutional variables in the 1945–2010 period. It contains measures of three tools of IO conflict management—mediation, economic sanctions, and peacekeeping—along institutionalization and authorization dimensions. This data can be used to study empirical trends in the system of conflict-managing IOs, processes of institutional evolution and the impact of institutional design on IO performance. The dataset also includes yearly observations on IO membership characteristics, including size, power polarity and a set of security-related institutional variables.

A preliminary analysis of the IOCM data yields a number of descriptive results. First, there has been a general surge of supranational conflict management since the end of the Second World War. The number of peace-brokering IOs has increased seven-fold, from three to 21 organizations, and there are now such organizations in most of the world's regions. Second, there have been periods of institutional *creation*, in which the world system has added new IOs with mandates in conflict management, and periods of institutional *deepening*, when existing IOs have grown their institutional capabilities. The data indicate

that the period from 1960 to 1990 can be classified as a period of IO creation, whereas the period after 1990 may be seen as a period of institutional deepening. Third, there is a high degree of variation across instruments. It is more common for IOs to institutionalize capabilities for diplomatic interventions than for economic sanctions or field missions. Fourth, there is ample variation across IOs, with some evolving their institutional instruments rapidly, whereas others change slowly or not at all. Fifth, the scope and depth of functional delegation vary across instruments and IO membership size. Instruments associated with lower sovereignty costs, such as mediation and good offices facilitation, are more commonly delegated to IOs, whereas military instruments are kept under more restrictive state control.

I discuss possible applications of the dataset, arguing that it can be used for conceptual typologies of institutional design, as well as being a source for explanatory or outcome variables in studies of institutional effects and evolution. To illustrate one such application, I perform a re-appraisal of an earlier study (Hansen et al., 2008) on the effects of institutional variation on the outcomes of IO involvement in interstate dispute bargaining. Multivariate analysis suggests that IOs with a higher level of institutionalization are more likely to bring interstate claims to a peaceful resolution, but that, depending on the systemic context, there is variation in the advantage received from different instruments. In the post-1945 era, field mission capabilities stand out as the most central resource for IOs seeking to move disputants to a negotiated settlement. My analysis endorses Hansen, Mitchell and Nemeth at a general level, but reveals that their corporate measure of IO institutionalization conceals important dimensions of heterogeneity, which can be surfaced using the more subtle distinctions available in the IOCM data.

The remainder of this paper is structured into four parts. The first introduces the function of IOs in conflict management, together with a brief review of existing literature and data sources, detailing the rationale for a new dataset. The second presents the structure of the IOCM data, presenting key concepts, coding procedures and empirical data sources. The third contains a preliminary analysis of the data, including disaggregation across time, organization, instrument and authorization types. The last part concludes and illustrates possible applications of the IOCM data.

Existing studies and data on IO conflict management

Prior efforts to gather data on IOs in conflict resolution are predominantly found in three areas. First, scholars exploring "Kantian peace" perspectives—the general impact of IOs and trade constellations on the propensity of military conflict—have generated a number of datasets on historical IO memberships. Wallace and Singer (1970) introduced the Correlates of War (COW) dataset on IO participation, covering all states of the international system from 1815 to 1964 and finding no significant positive relationship between IOs and peace. The COW data were subsequently updated by Pevehouse et al. (2004) to cover the period up to the year 2000, in a study that confirmed the findings by Wallace and Singer on the nature and growth of IOs in the world system. Jacobson et al. (1986) presented a dataset covering state membership in IOs from 1815 to 1980, finding that "increasing number of IGOs in the system appears to lessen the states' mean proneness to war" (141). Yet another dataset on membership was produced by Oneal and Russett (1999) to support an argument that joint IO membership promoted interstate peace. In a parallel undertaking, Volgy et al. (2008)

developed a large dataset on IOs, used by Faussett and Volgy (2010) to demonstrate an association between IO membership and lower conflict severity in post-Communist countries.

A second source of IO data originates with scholars interested in questions of institutional design. Relaxing the assumption that IOs are homogenous, this literature focuses attention on how institutional structure, autonomy and decision-making influence the ability of IOs to facilitate solutions to collective action problems (Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Koremenos et al., 2001; Martin, 1992; see also Hawkins et al., 2006; Ostrom, 2005). Studies of institutional design cover a wide range of policy areas, including international environmental agreements (Mitchell, 2003) and IO openness to transnational groups (Tallberg et al., 2013), but there are few in the area of conflict management. Some older studies of IOs, including Haas et al. (1972) and Haas (1983), discussed "regime characteristics" as an explanatory variable, but did not provide detailed measures of institutional variation. A more recent piece, Boehmer et al. (2004), provides data on IOs from 1950 to 1991, including a three-tiered measure of the depth of institutionalization: "minimal" IOs are largely interstate meeting forums, lacking established bureaucracies; "structured" IOs have assemblies, executives and more elaborate bureaucratic structures; and "interventionist" IOs have established mechanisms for conflict resolution and enforcement of policies and norms. Studies by Haftel (2007, 2012) present elaborate data on institutional design of 25 regional organizations in 5 year intervals between 1982 and 1997, with a focus on economic integration. Using this data to study the impact of institutionalization on the eruption of intraregional military disputes (MIDs), Haftel finds that "a wider scope of economic activity and regular meetings of high-level officials have a significant negative effect on the expected number of MIDs" (Haftel, 2007: 228).

Third, there are datasets that focus not on the IO themselves, but on instruments often employed by IOs in conflict management, such as peacekeeping (Fortna, 2008; Mays, 2010) or mediation (DeRouen et al., 2011; Regan, 2002). To this group we can also add comparative case studies (e.g. Tavares, 2009) and policy-oriented works that incorporate cross-institutional comparative analysis, such as Wulf (2009) and Thruelsen (2009).

The existing datasets (Table 1) provide adequate resources if our research questions concern the impact of IO membership or general institutional features on interstate peace. For other questions, their value is more limited. First, the majority of the existing data sources do not reflect institutional heterogeneity, and among the few that do, measures of institutionalization are either not sensitive to the full range of conflict managing instruments available to IOs (Boehmer et al., 2004) or focused on economic instruments (Haftel, 2007). Second, with the exception of Fortna (2008), all existing datasets are focused on variables relevant for interstate relations, making them unsuitable for studying how IOs engage with civil wars, the dominant form of military violence in the world today (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2014). Third, several of the datasets have geographic or temporal limitations (e.g. measuring IOs only every 5 years or treating them as temporally static) that make them unsuitable for the study of institutional evolution across time.

The IOCM dataset seeks to address these limitations. It incorporates variables that allow for disaggregation in several dimensions—across organizations, instruments, time and space—making it possible to take institutional heterogeneity more fully into account, both as outcomes and as explanatory variables. Second, it includes instruments that are relevant for conflict management in both inter- and intrastate conditions. Third, it contains yearly observations, making it possible to more accurately study temporal trends.

Table 1. Overview of existing IO datasets relevant for conflict management

Dataset	Orientation	Scope	IO heterogeneity	Time-sensitivity
Wallace and Singer (1970)	IO membership	System-wide, observations in 5 year intervals, 1815–1964	No	Some
Haas (1983, 1993)	IO conflict management	282 disputes referred to the UN, OAS, OAU, Arab League, and the Council of Europe	Limited	No
Jacobson et al. (1986)	IO membership	System-wide, 1815–1980	No	Some
Oneal and Russett (1999)	Joint IO membership	System-wide, 1885–1992	No	Some
Pevehouse et al. (2004)	IO membership	System-wide, observations in 5 year intervals, 1815–1964, annual observations 1965–2000	No	Some
Volgy et al. (2008)	IO membership and IO population structure	System-wide, 265 IOs, observations in 1975, 1989 and 2004	Limited	Some
Boehmer et al. (2004)	IO conflict management	System-wide, 297 IOs, static observations	Three-tier typology of institutionalization	No
Haftel (2007, 2012)	IO economic integration/conflict management	25 regional organizations, 1982–1997	Yes; 27 indicators for economic integration and institutionalization	Some; observations in 5 year-intervals

Table 2. List of international organizations in the IOCM dataset

IO	Year created	Original members	Members in 2010
Andean Community (CAN)	1969	5	4
Arab League (LAS)	1945	7	21
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)	1989	5	5
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	1967	5	10
Caribbean Commission (CariCom)	1973	5	15
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	1992	9	9
Commonwealth of Nations (CON)	1931	8	30
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)	1983	10	11
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	1975	15	16
European Union (EU)	1951	6	27
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)	1986	6	7
Nordic Council (NC)	1952	5	5
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	1948	12	26
Organization of African Unity (OAU)	1963	33	53
Organization of American States (OAS)	1948	21	35
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)	1981	6	6
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)	1969	24	55
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)	1973	31	50
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)	1985	7	8
Southern African Development Community (SADC)	1980	11	14
United Nations (UN)	1945	51	192

The IOCM data: selection, variables, and coding

In delineating the relevant population of IOs, two selection criteria were used. I included only (1) intergovernmental organizations, defined as (a) formal entities recognized by international law, having (b) at least three state members and (c) a minimum level of institutionalization, such as a permanent secretariat, headquarters or staff (cf. Pevehouse et al., 2004); and only those that (2) incorporated, at some level, functions concerned with the direct management of violent disputes, defined as formal mandates and specialized bureaucratic structures for mediation and/or military deployments.[3] I label these IOs "peace-brokering", in that they have the resources to engage in direct conflict management interventions, and do not merely function as "tables and chairs" for interstate negotiations. These criteria exclude non-governmental organizations active in conflict management and the large number of IOs that fall outside the realm of direct conflict management. They also exclude ad hoc conferences, informal networks, private enterprises, individual mediators and traditional forms of conflict management.

Applied against organizational directories (*Yearbook of International Organizations*), the criteria helped identify a set of 21 organizations, listed in Table 2 together with some general characteristics. The set includes both IOs for which security was the original function and IOs where security functions have gradually evolved in addition to other functions, such as ECOWAS or IGAD (cf. Haftel, 2007; Powers, 2004). The set overlaps very well with an inventory of peace-brokering IOs identified by Shannon (2009), drawing on data from Boehmer et al. (2004) and the Issue Correlates of War Project's Multilateral Treaties of Pacific Settlement data (Hensel, 2005). My data include all of the organizations on

Shannon's list, excluding courts (such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration) and organizations of the pre-1945 era (such as the League of Nations or the German Confederation). I cross-referenced the list of identified organizations against data on IO mediation and peacekeeping interventions (DeRouen et al., 2011; Regan et al., 2009) and found it to include all organizations that had been active in intrastate conflict management interventions since 1945. Using Correlates of War data, I confirmed that the listed IOs have permanent secretariats, at least three members and regular meetings, as stipulated by the above criteria. Hence, I am confident that this dataset covers the majority of IOs actively involved in direct conflict management in the world today.

Variables

Informed by literature on institutional design (Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Koremenos et al., 2001; Martin, 1992), literature on specific instruments of conflict management (Fortna, 2008; Greig and Diehl, 2012; Martin, 1993), policy-oriented work (e.g. Goldstein, 2011; Thruelsen, 2009) and IO reports (United Nations, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2011), I identified measures of IO design and capabilities most relevant for contemporary conflict management, focusing on functional specialization and authorization procedures. An overview of the variables in the dataset, including coding rules and sources, can be found in the Appendix. Further details are in the codebook and electronic data file.

The three main instruments of IO conflict management are reflected in the variables *diplomatic interventions capability*, *economic sanctions capability* and *field mission capability*. These measures seek to capture the role of information, coercion and guarantees in IO conflict management, respectively.[4] Information can mitigate conflict by correcting misperceptions and by providing coordination points for settlement (Gilady and Russett, 2002; Kydd, 2003; Rauchhaus, 2006). Coercion can be used to prevent, deter and punish an actor engaging in violence or war, thereby increasing the cost of such behavior relative to a political settlement (Gilady and Russett, 2002; Martin, 1993). Guarantees can help the enforcement of contracts, diminishing incentives to defect (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008; Walter, 2002). The *diplomatic interventions capability* measure seeks to capture the ability of an IO to gather, process and disseminate relevant information to conflict parties, as well as provide and formulate coordination points (peace agreements) that meet their joint interests. The *economic sanctions capability* measure seeks to capture the ability of an IO to leverage economic coercion, primarily by suspending members and imposing restrictions to commercial activity.[5] The *field mission capability* measure seeks to capture the ability of an IO to improve the enforceability of peace agreements by the provision of military monitoring or peacekeeping missions.

For each of the three intervention capabilities—diplomatic, economic and military—the data contain yearly observations for two subvariables. The *institutionalization* of a capability is scored on a five-point scale, ranging from 0 to 4, where higher scores reflect greater institutional structures, taking into consideration both the size and scope of formal bureaucratic support and the gradual aggregation of practice and experience (Tables 3 and 4). At the lowest level (0), an IO has no institutional structure in place to support a particular capability; at the highest level (4), it has established institutional bodies to provide specialized administrative and operative support for a given capability, together with long-ranging experience of using it. The variable *authorization* indicates at which institutional level interventions using a given conflict management capability can be initiated, reflecting the degree of delegation by

Table 3. Coding of conflict management intervention capabilities (I)

	Institutionalization	Authorization
Diplomatic interventions capability	0–4	0–4
Economic sanctions capability	0–4	0–4
Field mission capability	0–4	0–4

Note: For each of the three conflict management instruments (diplomatic/economic sanctions/field mission), there are two variables, institutionalization and authorization, for a total of six variables. Irrespective of instrument, institutionalization and authorization are coded in the same way, as described in Table 4.

the IO's member states (cf. Haftel and Thompson, 2006; Hawkins et al., 2006). While the variable is not necessarily ordinal, higher authorization scores could be regarded as reflecting a higher degree of delegation and supranational independence. At the lowest level (0), an IO is not mandated to employ the relevant capability; at the highest level (4), authority has been fully delegated, implying that supranational officials can independently authorize its usage.

Consider a few illustrating examples of this coding. For 30 years after its creation in 1963, the Organization of African Unity (later African Union), lacked any mandate or bureaucratic structures to engage in field missions (coded as 0). In 1993, the organization established a mechanism for conflict resolution, which included peacekeeping and collaboration with UN peace operations, together with some minimal bureaucratic structures (coded as 1). Then, in 2002, the African Union went through a serious upgrading of its mandate and institutional structure, establishing, among other bodies, a Peace and Security Council, supported by a range of subsidiary bureaucratic bodies (coded as 2). In the practice dimension, the organization is scored as 0 until 2003, when it dispatched a peacekeeping operation to the Burundian civil war, "the first operation wholly initiated, planned and executed by AU members" (Ayangafac and Cilliers, 2011), bringing its total field mission score to 3, where it remained through to the end of the observation series in 2010.

As for economic sanctions capabilities, the South African Development Community (SADC), established in 1980, lacked a mandate to utilize this capability (coded as 0) until 1992, when article 33 of the revised treaty included provisions stipulating that "sanctions may be leveraged against any member" under certain conditions, including threats to regional peace. This expansion of the mandate yielded SADC a score of 1, where it remained until 2010, as no specialized support structure, beyond the general SADC secretariat, was institutionalized in this time period.

The UN provides a good illustration of coding of the diplomatic interventions capability. At its inception, there was very little bureaucratic support for diplomatic conflict resolution beyond the main UN chambers, but from the 1950s, as the tasks of the organization and its Secretary General expanded, a small cluster of officials and units functioned to provide support for mediation and other forms of conflict resolution (coded as 1), but no major institutionalized support existed before the establishment of the Department of Political Affairs in 1992, after which the UN started to build a much more sophisticated and sizeable institutional support for its mediation activities (coded as 2). As to practice, this developed more rapidly at the UN, going from 0 in 1945 to 2 within a decade, as Dag Hammarskjöld pioneered the model of an activist Secretary General through a series of diplomatic engagements in the 1950s (Skjelsbaek, 1991; United Nations, 2013). The total diplomatic capability

Table 4. Coding of conflict management intervention capabilities (2)

Variable	Coding
Institutionalization	A measure of the resources available to support the exercise of a given conflict management instrument. It is a combined measure of standing, specialized administrative capabilities ("bureaucratic support") and experience and skill in the relevant domain ("practice"). The "bureaucratic support" dimension is coded in the following manner: 0—IO lacks a mandate to engage in this area of conflict management; 1—mandate in treaty or protocol, no specialized institutional support (function is supported via general IO secretariat); 2—mandate in treaty or protocol, specialized institutional support (specialized department or agency with at least 50 staff members). The "practice" dimension is coded in the following manner: 0—IO lacks mandate/never exercised capability; 1—exercised at least once in the last 10 years; 2—exercised at least five times in different countries in the last 10 years. The scores for "bureaucratic support" and "practice" are added up to yield a 0–4 point score for the variable.
Authorization	A measure of the locus of authority for the initiation of a given conflict management capability: 0—no rules for authorizing the use of the relevant capability exist or are formalized; 1—unanimity or consensus required for authorization ("Consensus"); 2—majority (simple, qualified, or other) required for authorization ("Majority"); 3—authorization of the capability delegated to a subset of member states ("Council"); 4—authorization of the capability delegated to a supranational entity ("Supranational").

score of the UN is hence coded as 1 between 1945 and 1948 (1 for bureaucratic support and 0 for practice), as 2 between 1948 and 1953 (1 plus 1 for practice, as the UN engaged in its first mediation intervention in Israel/Palestine) and as 3 between 1953 and 1992 (1 plus 2), when the Department of Political Affairs was created, bringing the UN's diplomatic capability score to 4 (2 plus 2).

The data also contain a set of variables reflecting other security mechanisms of IOs. These include *collective security* arrangements, *confidence-building measures* (CBMs) and *early warning* systems, each receiving a score of 1 if an IO has corresponding functions in a given year. Definitions of these mechanisms can be found in the Appendix.

IOs are evolving structures, with new members added over time and, sometimes, members leaving, voluntarily or as a result of suspension. For each IO, the dataset contains yearly observations on the identity of its *members*, identified by their COW country codes, as well as a variable, *membership size*, that gives the total number of members of an IO in a given year. The members of the included IOs are heterogeneous, ranging from smaller and weaker states to larger and more powerful states. The distribution of power is generally thought to be a valuable explanatory variable in theories of international relations, both for the behavior of the international system as a whole (Waltz, 1979) and for the constitution of IOs (Stone, 2011). To capture such dynamics, the dataset incorporates data on the "internal structure" of IOs. There are yearly observations for total *power of members*, as a share of world trade, as well as the distribution of power within each IO, represented by the variable *power polarity*, calculated on the basis of a formula for concentration of material capacities formulated by Ray and Singer (1973) and similar to indices used by economists to measure the concentration of competition in a market (e.g. the Herfindahl index).[6] Taking into consideration both the number IO members as well as the relative inequality between them, a higher polarity index score (closer to 1) indicates a higher concentration of power, whereas a lower score (closer to 0) reflects a situation with more evenly resourced members.

Sources and coding procedures

In compiling the data, several types of primary and secondary sources were used. The key measures on conflict management instruments were scored based on analysis of multilateral treaties, protocols and administrative decisions, together with data sourced from IO reports and web pages, such as organograms and budget records. The extent of documentation varied by organization, with some (such as the Arab Maghreb Union) scored on the basis of one treaty, whereas others (such as the UN or AU) were scored on the basis of several dozens of items. After initial scanning of texts, relevant paragraphs were extracted for evaluation and comparison against scoring criteria (as described in the codebook). For years in which there was no change in the institutionalization or authorization of a given capability, I awarded a score identical to that of the previous year. To determine an IO's practical experience of interventions in a particular policy area, I relied on data on IO interventions gathered from Regan et al. (2009), DeRouen et al. (2011), Fortna (2008) and Mays (2010) as well as from directories available on IO web pages. Other variables have been scored using IO records and reports, monographs and IO web pages. Data on IO membership and capabilities were extracted from the COW datasets on IOs (Pevehouse et al., 2004) and national material capabilities (Singer et al., 1972). A fuller description of data sources, together with coding criteria, can be found in the codebook. Many sources are also referenced in the electronic data file.



Figure 1. Number of peace-brokering IOs in the international system.

Patterns in the data: IO conflict management across time and space

This section provides a preliminary descriptive analysis of the IOCM data. I first describe patterns in the aggregate data. Then I disaggregate the data by conflict management instrument, authorization patterns and collective security arrangements.[7]

The system of peace-brokering IOs: creation and deepening

At the end of the Second World War, the international system contained only three IOs that could convincingly be classified as peace-brokering: the UN, the LAS and the Commonwealth of Nations. The first two were newly established and the third was still very much a British-dominated organization. Some 65 years later, there were no less than 21 organizations with mandates to engage in conflict management, although there was wide variation as to their relative ambition and ability.

The proliferation of organizations is illustrated in Figure 1. The pattern is vaguely S-shaped, with two periods of slower growth, after the Second World War and after the Cold War, sandwiching a period of steady increase, lasting from the early 1960s to the first years of the 1990s. Growth in that period is largely driven by novel creation of IOs in regions undergoing decolonization, in particular in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. Once created, IOs tend to survive: with the exception of organizations that experience generational shifts (e.g. the transformation of the OAU into the AU), no organization is ever terminated. Over time, this has created institutional overlap in some regions, especially in Europe and Africa, where parallel institutions are mandated to carry out similar tasks. Other regions, especially South Asia and East Asia, have no or few organizations mandated to engage in security cooperation. The overall pattern in Figure 1 is consistent with the findings of Wallace and



Figure 2. Average institutionalization of peace-brokering IOs, 1946–2010. Institutionalization measured as additive index (ranging from 0 to 4) composed of the average scores for the three main intervention instruments.

Singer (1970: 280–281), who identified 1945–1964 as a period of institutional growth, and with Pevehouse et al. (2004: 107), who identified the 1990s as a period of slow growth (see also Haftel, 2012 and Mansfield and Milner, 1999).

The evolution of existing institutions follows a different temporal pattern. Figure 2 displays the average institutionalization of all IOs in the system, calculated as a simple additive index with three subcomponents.[8] The index follows an upward trajectory from 1945 to the mid-1960s, after which it shifts downwards until the early 1990s, when it again starts to increase. The negative trend from the mid-1960s to the 1990s reflects the entry of newly established IOs (as seen Figure 1) with lower levels of institutionalization. Over time, many of these IOs, together with some of the "older" IOs, undergo a period of institutional growth, coinciding with the end of the Cold War, which accounts for the rapidly increasing levels of institutionalization toward the end of period.

Viewed together, Figures 1 and 2 lead us to conclude that the system of peace-brokering IOs has evolved through two key phases: a phase of *institutional establishment*, in which such IOs were gradually extended to cover the majority of the world's regions, followed by a phase of *institutional deepening*, in which existing institutions accumulated bureaucratic bodies and expertise.[9] This pattern of quantitative growth followed by qualitative refinement suggests that the system of peace-brokering IOs may have ecological similarities to other organizational systems, such as the proliferation of firms in a new market (Moore, 1996) or diffusion of innovations (Ayres, 1990).[10] It may also reflect a trend of increasing delegation to international bodies from around 1990 (cf. Hawkins et al., 2006), confirming the "rise" of regional organizations as security managers described in work by Haftel (2007) and Frazier and Dixon (2006). At the same time, the patterns here may contrast with developments in



Figure 3. Average institutionalization of three major conflict management capabilities, 1946–2010.

other policy areas, such as trade, where bilateral treaties have become increasingly popular (cf. Menon, 2007), and with the growth of informal intergovernmental arrangements in other areas (cf. Vabulas and Snidal, 2013).

Disaggregation across instruments

The data show that there is considerable variation in institutionalization, not only over time, but also across instruments and organizations. Figure 3 displays the average institutionalization of all IOs, disaggregated by diplomatic, military and economic instruments, respectively. It is evident that, for most observation years, the average diplomatic capability is higher than the average field mission or economic sanctions capabilities. The impression is one of parallel tracks of institutionalization, where different instruments largely follow the general institutionalization curve seen above, but at different levels. There are two exceptions to this general pattern: early IOs had a higher field mission capacity than other IOs, and the average level of diplomatic capacity is more stable than the general trend. This reflects the fact that the group of IOs that entered the system between 1960 and 1990 often had a minimum amount of diplomatic capacity, but generally did not develop field mission capacities until the 1990s or later.

Disaggregation across organizations

Disaggregating institutionalization scores by organization yields a pattern of wide variation. Some organizations, like the UN, get relatively high institutionalization scores for most observation years, whereas others, such as SAARC, get low scores. There is also variation in the speed of institutional growth, as seen in Figures 4 and 5. Some organizations go through periods of rapid institutional growth. The three organizations in Figure 4—the EU, AU and ECOWAS—all exemplify such institutionalization processes. Up until around 1990, these organizations had few conflict management instruments, receiving a score lower than 1. After the Cold War, however, they rapidly expanded their repertoire of such means, including practical experience of diplomatic and military interventions, reflected in scores rising to around 2 in the year 2000 and around 3 for the last observations. A pattern of



Figure 4. Average institutionalization of select organizations with periods of rapid institutional growth.



Figure 5. Average institutionalization of select organizations with static institutional development.

slower, or static, development is seen for a group of organizations that includes the OIC, LAS and ASEAN, as illustrated in Figure 5. These organizations do not change very much at all and their sporadic experience of conflict management does not translate into lasting institutional structures.



Figure 6. Authorization of conflict management by type of instrument (2010). Percentages show the share of IOs with a particular configuration.



Figure 7. Authorization of field mission capabilities by size of IOs (2010).

Authorization patterns

The data yields insights into the pattern of delegation by states. Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate how the scope and depth of delegation vary with the nature of the instrument (policy area) and the nature of the IO membership (size). Authorization is measured on a variable with five categories, "Supranational", "Council", "Majority", "Consensus" and "No mandate", indicating the locus of authority (for details, see the Appendix). As one would expect, the instrument associated with the lowest sovereignty costs, diplomatic interventions, is more commonly delegated to a higher level. For about 30% of the IOs in the dataset, diplomatic



Figure 8. Collective security arrangements, 1950s–2000s.

interventions can be authorized by Secretary Generals (or similar functions), that is, independently of member states. State control is comparatively more restrictive with regard to economic and military means. No organization allows the supranational authorization of field missions, but four organizations have adopted the "council" model pioneered by the UN.

A cross-tabulation of forms of authorization (of field missions) across the size of IO membership (Figure 7) indicates that IOs with fewer member states tend to lack field mission capacities or, if they have a mandate in this area, keep it under strict consensual control. For all but the two largest, which allow the authorization of military operations by a subset of member states, consensual authorization is the most common model.

Collective security

The extent to which the IOs have arrangements for collective security is largely a function of the timing of their creation. As can be seen in Figure 8, IOs established in the immediate post-war era tend to include measures for collective security, whereas more recently established IOs are less likely to do so. As we know, the "early" IOs in the data include the UN, NATO and LAS, security-oriented organizations for which the principle of collective security was at the center of each respective enterprise (at least aspirationally). Many of the later IOs were originally established with a view to promoting commercial exchange, which may account for why they have not explicitly incorporated measures for collective security.

Institutional design as explanation: using IOCM data to re-examine Hansen et al. (2008)

The IOCM dataset can be applied in many ways. First, since it allows for simultaneous disaggregation in several dimensions, it could be used as a conceptual tool in the building of IO typologies. Second, the data provides a testing ground for research on institutional formation and evolution, including questions regarding membership, centralization and institutional control, within the issue area of conflict management. Used independently or in combination

with other data sources, the IOCM dataset could be used to study institutional variation across organizations, instruments, geographic areas and time. Third, a key application of the IOCM dataset is research on institutional effects. Putting the IOCM data on the explanatory side enables us to link institutional design to several studies in the field of peace and conflict research. For example, it may be used for questions relating to the overall impact of IOs on the propensity to conflict in the international system. If combined with data on war, it could thus be used to elaborate existing work on IO conflict management or to test further causal mechanisms underlying arguments of the liberal peace. At a finer level of disaggregation, the data could be used to explain the characteristics and outcome of particular interventions, such as IO mediation or peacekeeping.

As an illustration of the latter, using the IOCM data, I replicated and re-evaluated the results found in a key study on the role of institutional design in IO performance (Hansen et al., 2008; henceforth HMN). As explained in greater detail in their text (pp. 305–309), HMN test for the effects of IO involvement in interstate disputes, exploring the impact of variation in scope of institutionalization. They study a sample of 1690 interstate territorial and maritime claims in the period from 1816 to 2001, sourced from the Issues Correlates of War dataset (Hensel, 2001). Using multivariate regression, HMN identify a causal effect of higher institutionalization: "the most highly institutionalized organizations have a clear advantage for getting disputing parties to reach agreement" (p. 313).

While HMN represent an advancement over several earlier studies, their data and measures retain homogeneity assumptions that, from the perspective of the IOCM data, seem unwarranted. For example, HMN's institutionalization measure, taken directly from Boehmer et al. (2004), is static, obscuring institutional evolution across time, which, as has been demonstrated by Haftel (2007) and this article, is significant. Some IOs in HMN's data ostensibly do not change for periods of more than 100 years—measurements that clearly depart from historical experience, opening up for a range of validity problems. Further, the dataset used by HMN does not allow for separation out of specific instruments of conflict resolution, which, as suggested by the above analysis, may display significant variation across IOs. In short, HMN's study relies on measures of IO institutionalization that are limited—conceptually and empirically—compared with the IOCM data.

Using the IOCM data, I recoded HMN's data as follows. For each settlement attempt, I added observations from IOCM on the institutionalization characteristics of the intervening IO in the matching year. I modified the data to exclude the Vatican, which HMN had included as an IO, together with IOs that only existed in the pre-1945 era, such as the Paris Peace Conference.[11]

The results of the analyses are reported in Table 5. To account for selection effects—the risk that the distribution of IO involvement is correlated with factors explaining success—I followed HMN's example and employed a two-stage Heckman model (Heckman, 1979), which simultaneously estimates one equation for the selection of IO involvement and one for its outcome. In the first equation, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the claim experienced a conflict management attempt by an IO. In the second equation, the dependent variable equals 1 if such conflict management led to a negotiated agreement between the disputants.

Model 1 replicates HMN's main model and results: IOs with the capability to engage in binding conflict management, such as arbitration, and with a higher degree of institutionalization, are more likely to result in a settlement than involvement by less institutionalized

Table 5. IO conflict management and reaching agreement

	Model 1 (HMN)	Model 2 (with IOCM data)	Model 2 (with IOCM data, post-1945)
Reaching agreement			
Minimum IO democracy history	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	–0.05 (0.02) ***
Mean IO preference similarity	0.06 (0.39)	–0.04 (0.39)	–1.21 (1.06)
HMN institutionalization × binding	0.25 (0.07) ***	0.16 (0.08) *	–0.26 (0.16)
Global	–0.21 (0.12) *	–0.09 (0.14)	–0.43 (0.37)
Diplomatic intervention capability		0.28 (0.14) **	–0.27 (0.21)
Economic sanctions capability		–0.19 (0.10) *	–0.19 (0.12)
Field mission capability		0.03 (0.11)	0.35 (0.18) **
Authorization		–0.24 (0.08) ***	–0.18 (0.12)
Constant	0.04 (0.44)	0.09 (0.47)	3.50 (1.41)
IO conflict management			
Shared IO memberships	0.05 (0.02) ***	0.05 (0.02) ***	–0.00 (0.02)
Issue salience	0.05 (0.02) **	0.05 (0.02) **	–0.04 (0.03)
Power parity	0.35 (0.15) **	0.35 (0.15) **	0.62 (0.19)***
Minimum democracy–autocracy	0.02 (0.01) ***	0.02 (0.01) ***	0.01 (0.01)
Procedural/functional	–0.47 (0.11) ***	–0.47 (0.11) ***	–0.13 (0.14)
River claim	0.46 (0.14) ***	0.46 (0.14) ***	0.07 (0.20)
Maritime claim	0.41 (0.12) ***	0.41 (0.12) ***	0.42 (0.14)***
Constant	–2.01 (0.20) ***	–2.01 (0.20) ***	–1.46 (0.27)
ρ	0.53	0.66	–0.78
N	1473 (126)	1473 (126)	1015 (62)
Adj. R^2	0.08	0.15	0.17

Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at $p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

IOs. Model 1 also demonstrates that there is systematic variation in IO involvement across issue types and that IOs are, on average, intervening in more salient issues.

In model 2, I modify HMN's model by adding IOCM data, which immediately displays the benefit of the deeper disaggregation. Using the same observations as in model 1 and controlling for the basic type of institutionalization studied by HMN, I model variation on the three major intervention capabilities, as well as an authorization variable, coded based on the relevant intervention capability. The results strongly suggest that, when disaggregated, the effects of institutionalization captured in the HMN study are due to a range of institutional factors, with varying effects. Two results stand out in particular. First, IOs with a higher diplomatic institutionalization are more likely to resolve claims between states. Second, IOs where decision-making is more tightly controlled by member states seem to have an advantage, as suggested by the negative coefficient on authorization.[12]

To better capture an empirical domain matching the assumptions of the IOCM data, in model 3 I subset HMN's data to include only observations in the post-1945 era. This leaves 1015 claims, of which 62 saw involvement by IOs. In this subset, one institutional feature stands out as particularly advantageous: the ability to plan, coordinate and deploy military deployments. The coefficient for field mission capability is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that, since the Second World War, IOs have stood a greater chance of resolving claims if they could provide peacekeeping forces or similar deployments. The main result of HMN's model disappears completely, demonstrating its sensitivity to more disaggregated measures of institutional characteristics.

The negative ρ in model 3 implies that unobserved factors correlated with IO involvement are negatively correlated with the probability of reaching agreement, implying a negative selection effect. This suggests that IOs in the IOCM dataset tend to intervene in conflicts that are particularly difficult to resolve, a pattern that has been identified by several previous scholars (Fortna, 2008; Gartner, 2011).

While the statistical analyses confirm HMN's results at the most general level, they clearly illustrate how a greater range of nuances can be brought out, if the scholar is given the means to shine the light on institutional variation. Some subcomponents of general institutionalization are more important than others and, as illustrated by coefficient shifts between models 2 and 3, certain features seem to more advantageous under certain international conditions. Here, variation in institutional features of import seems to square nicely with historical experience. In the longer term (model 2), covering nearly 200 years of interstate relations, IOs with stronger diplomatic capabilities seem to have an advantage, whereas military instruments provide no measurable benefit. In the post 1945 era (model 3), covering a period in which we know that military instruments of global governance, such as peacekeeping, have been frequently used, the related features of institutional design (field mission capability) provide a clear advantage in moving states to reach agreement. Again, this suggests the added value of looking beyond generalized measures of institutionalization.

Conclusion

Research on international organizations in international relations and conflict studies has long suffered from an imbalance between theory development, empirical testing and data sources. The third leg of this trinity, data, has not been robust enough to adequately support the expectations and demands of the other two. Many of the existing datasets on IOs have been blind to institutional heterogeneity or too focused on interstate conflict or have not captured the evolution of IOs over time.

The dataset presented in this paper can provide one step toward improving this situation. Covering 21 organizations in the 1945–2010 period, it provides measures of institutional characteristics not previously available to scholars. It includes institutional design variables that cover the three key instruments of IO conflict management—mediation, economic sanctions and peacekeeping—and auxiliary security functions, such as collective security. It also provides data on the "internal" structure of each of the 21 IO systems, including data on membership and the distribution of power.

A descriptive analysis of the data reveals a number of empirical patterns. First, there has been a general surge of supranational conflict management since the end of the Second World War, with the number of IOs active in this domain increasing from 3 to 21. Second, this population of IOs has undergone three general phases: two periods of institutional deepening (1945–1960 and 1990–2010) and one period of institutional establishment (1960–1990). Third, there is a high degree of variation across organizations, with some organizations, like the UN, displaying high institutionalization for all types of conflict-management instruments, whereas others, such as the LAS, are much less institutionalized. Fourth, there is much variation across IOs, with some evolving their institutional instruments very rapidly, whereas others change very slowly or not at all. Fifth, IOs tend to delegate authority more for instruments with lower sovereignty costs, such as mediation.

These descriptive results only scratch the surface of the dataset. In the paper, I briefly discussed possible application, including descriptive typologies and how the IOCM data can be used as independent or dependent variables in correlational studies. By linking the IOCM data to existing datasets, researchers will be able to explore these and other approaches in greater depth. As an illustration, I showed how the results of a leading study of institutional performance (Hansen et al., 2008) were sensitive to adding the more nuanced measures of IO institutionalization made available here.

Acknowledgment

I thank Yoram Haftel, Jonas Tallberg, Isak Svensson, Thomas Sommerer, Lisa Dellmuth, Johan Eriksson and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions. This article was written during a research visit at Stanford University in the spring of 2013 and I am grateful to James Fearon for hosting me there.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

1. The dataset is available at http://www.statsvet.su.se/forskning/våra-forskare/magnus-lundgren or via correspondence with the author (magnus.lundgren@statsvet.su.se).
2. Data on civil war mediation (DeRouen et al., 2011) show that 16% of all civil-war-years in the 1990s received interventions by IOs, a four-fold increase from the previous decade. Overviews of the literature on IO conflict management and mediation (e.g. Goldstein, 2011; Greig and Diehl, 2012; Wallensteen and Svensson, 2014) suggest that the share of conflict management channeled via IOs increased further in the 2000s and 2010s.
3. See Tables 3 and 4 and the Appendix for more details on these structures.
4. These links are schematic. While each instrument may be linked to a "dominant" causal pathway, each is likely to have secondary effects, channeled via alternate pathways. For example, a field mission may not only provide guarantees, but also informational functions.
5. Of the three instruments, economic sanctions are the least specific instrument: while they are often employed as an instrument to deter or de-escalate armed violence (e.g. as employed against pro-Russian contingents in the 2014 civil war in Ukraine), they are also frequently employed to change the behavior of actors not engaged in armed violence.
6. The *power polarity* score is calculated by the formula

$$\sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_t}(S_{it})^2 - \frac{1}{N_t}}{1 - \frac{1}{N_t}}}$$

   where N_t is the number of members in a given IO in year t, S_{it} is the proportion of global material capabilities possessed by state i in year t and $\sum_{i=1}^{N_t}(S_{it})^2$ is the sum of the proportion of global material capabilities possessed by all members of the IO in the year t. Further details can be found in Ray and Singer (1973). See also Bueno de Mesquita (1975) and Mansfield (1993).
7. Not all variables in the dataset are included in the analysis. A cross-reference with the Appendix can be helpful in identifying which are excluded.
8. For each organization and year, an index score was calculated as the average of *field mission capability*, *economic sanctions capability* and *diplomatic capability*. Since each of these ranges from

0 to 4, the index score also ranges from 0 to 4, with lower values representing a lower degree of institutionalization.

9. The patterns described here are valid for both global and regional organizations, and they are robust to excluding the UN from the analysis.
10. The validity of the pattern is corroborated by a recent UN report, detailing the historical evolution of UN political missions. The UN report structures the post-Second World War period into three eras: "a first period of new mission design (1948-early 1960s); a second period of relative inactivity (late 1960s–late 1980s); and a third period of rediscovery (post-cold war)" (United Nations, 2013: A/68/223).
11. The results in models 2 and 3 in Table 5 are robust to not making these modifications.
12. These results are robust to excluding HMN's institutionalization variable altogether. The negative coefficient for authorization in model 2 indicates that interventions originating in unanimity decisions have a higher effectiveness, possibly suggesting that IO decision-making procedures affect intervention credibility in ways similar to what has been suggested for the domestic realm (Fearon, 1994; Schultz, 2001).

References

Abbott KW and Snidal D (1998) Why states act through international organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1): 3–32.

Ayangafac C and Cilliers J (2011) African solutions to African problems: Assessing the capacity of African peace and security architecture. In: Crocker C, Osler Hampson F and Aall P (eds) *Rewiring Regional Security in a Fragmented World*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, pp. 115–148.

Ayres R (1990) Technological transformations and long waves. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change* 37(1): 1–37.

Boehmer C, Gartzke E and Nordstrom T (2004) Do intergovernmental organizations promote peace? *World Politics* 57(1): 1–38.

Bueno de Mesquita B (1975) Measuring systemic polarity. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19(2): 187–216.

DeRouen K, Bercovitch J and Pospieszna P (2011) Introducing the civil wars mediation (CWM) dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 48(5): 663–672.

Doyle MW (2005) Three pillars of the liberal peace. *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 463–466.

Doyle MW and Sambanis N (2006) *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Fausett E and TJ Volgy (2010) Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and interstate conflict: Parsing out IGO effects for alternative dimensions of conflict in postcommunist space. *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1): 79–101.

Fearon JD (1994) Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. *American Political Science Review* 88(3): 577–592.

Fortna VP (2008) *Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Frazier DV and Dixon WJ (2006) Third-party intermediaries and negotiated settlements, 1946–2000. *International Interactions* 32(4): 385–408.

Gartner SS (2011) Signs of trouble: Regional organization mediation and civil war agreement durability. *Journal of Politics* 73(2): 380–390.

Gilady L and Russett B (2002) Peacemaking and conflict resolution. In: Carlsnaes W, Risse T and Simmons BA (eds) *Handbook of International Relations*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, pp. 392–408.

Goldstein J (2011) *Winning the War on War*. New York: Penguin

Greig JM and Diehl P (2012) *International Mediation*. Cambridge: Polity Press

Haas EB (1983) Regime decay: Conflict management and international organizations, 1945–81. *International Organization* 37(2): 189–256.
Haas EB, Butterworth RL and Nye JS (1972) *Conflict Management by International Organizations*. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press
Haftel Y (2007) Designing for peace: Regional integration arrangements, institutional variation, and militarized interstate disputes. *International Organization* 61(1): 217–237.
Haftel Y (2012) *Regional Economic Institutions and Conflict Mitigation*. Ann Abor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Haftel Y and Thompson A (2006) The independence of international organizations: Concept and applications. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(2), 253–275.
Hansen HE, Mitchell SM and Nemeth SC (2008) IO mediation of interstate conflicts: Moving beyond the global versus regional dichotomy. *Journal of conflict resolution* 52(2): 295–325.
Hawkins DG, Lake DA, Nielson DL and Tierny MJ (eds) (2006) *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Heckman JJ (1979) Sample selection bias as a specification error. *Econometrica* 47(1): 153–162.
Hensel PR (2001) Contentious issues and world politics: The management of territorial claims in the Americas. 1816–1992. *International Studies Quarterly* 45(1): 81–109.
Hensel PR (2005) Multilateral Treaties of Pacific Settlement (MTOPS) Data Set, version 1.4. Available from: http://data.icow.org
Jacobson HK, Reisinger WM and Mathers T (1986) National entanglements in international governmental organizations. *American Political Science Review* 80(1): 141–159.
Koremenos B, Lipson C and Snidal D (2001) The rational design of international institutions. *International Organization* 55(4): 761–799.
Kydd AH (2003) Which side are you on? Bias, credibility, and mediation. *American Journal of Political Science* 100(3): 597–611.
Mansfield ED (1993) Concentration, polarity, and the distribution of power. *International Studies Quarterly* 37(1): 105–128.
Mansfield ED and Milner HV (1999) The new wave of regionalism. *International Organization* 53(3): 589–627.
Martin LL (1992) Interests, power, and multilateralism. *International Organization* 46(4): 765–792.
Martin LL (1993) *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mays TM (2010) *Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping*, Vol. 29. Plymouth: Scarecrow Press.
Mearsheimer JJ (1994) The false promise of international institutions. *International Security* 19(3): 5–49.
Menon J (2007) Bilateral trade agreements. *Asian-Pacific Economic Literature* 21(2): 29–47.
Mitchell RB (2003) International environmental agreements: A survey of their features, formation, and effects. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 28: 429–461.
Moore JF (1996) *The Death of Competition: Leadership and Strategy in the Age of Business Ecosystems*. New York: Harper Business.
Oneal JR and Russett B (1999) Assessing the liberal peace with alternative specifications: Trade still reduces conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 36(4): 423–444.
Ostrom E (2005) *Understanding Institutional Diversity*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Pevehouse JC, Nordstrom T and Warnke K (2004) The COW-2 International Organizations Dataset Version 2.0. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21(2): 101–119.
Powers K (2004) Regional trade agreements as military alliances. *International Interactions* 30(4): 373–395.
Rauchhaus RW (2006) Asymmetric information, mediation, and conflict management. *World Politics* 58(2): 207–241.

Ray JL and Singer JD (1973) Measuring the concentration of power in the international system. *Sociological Methods and Research* 1(4): 403–437.
Regan PM (2002) Third-party interventions and the duration of intrastate conflicts. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 55–73.
Regan P, Frank R and Aydin A (2009) Diplomatic interventions and civil war: A new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 46(1): 135–146.
Schultz K (2001) *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shannon M (2009) Preventing war and providing the peace? International organizations and the management of territorial disputes. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(2): 144–163.
Singer JD, Bremer S and Stuckey J (1972) Capability distribution, uncertainty, and major power war, 1820–1965. In: Russett B (ed.) *Peace, War, and Numbers*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, pp. 19–48.
Skjelsbæk K (1991) The UN Secretary-General and the mediation of international disputes. *Journal of Peace Research* 28(1): 99–115.
Stone RW (2011) *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tallberg J, Sommerer T, Squatrito T and Jönsson C (2013) *The Opening Up of International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tavares R (2009) *Regional Security: The Capacity of International Organizations*. Abingdon: Routledge.
Themnér L and Wallensteen P (2014) Armed conflict, 1946–2013. *Journal of Peace Research* 51(4): 541–554.
Thruelsen PD (2009) *International Organisations: Their Role in Conflict Management*. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College.
United Nations (2004) A more secure world: Our shared responsibility. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.
United Nations (2005) In larger freedom: Towards development, security and human rights for all (UN General Assembly document A/59/2005).
United Nations (2009) Report of the Secretary General on Enhancing Mediation and its Support Activities (UN Security Council document S/2009/189).
United Nations (2011) Preventive diplomacy: delivering results (UN Security Council document S/2011/552).
United Nations (2013) United Nations Political Missions: Report of the Secretary General (United Nations: Department of Political Affairs; A/68/223).
Vabulas F and Snidal D (2013) Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements. *Review of International Organizations* 8(2): 193–220.
Volgy TJ, Fausett E, Grant KA and Rodgers S (2008) Identifying formal intergovernmental organizations. *Journal of Peace Research* 45(6): 837–850.
Wallace M and Singer JD (1970) Intergovernmental organization in the global system: 1815–1964: A quantitative description. *International Organization* 24(2): 239–287.
Wallensteen P and Svensson I (2014) Talking peace: International mediation in armed conflicts. *Journal of Peace Research* 51(2): 315–327.
Walter BF (2002) *Committing to Peace: The Succesful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Waltz KN (1979) *Theory of International Politics*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
Wulf H (ed.) (2009) Still under construction: regional organisations' capacities for conflict prevention. Institute for Development and Peace, INEF report 97/2009.

Appendix

Table A1. Overview of variables, coding and sources

Variable	Type and coding	Range	Sources
Diplomatic interventions capability	Ordered categorical; 0–4; aggregate of measure of "bureaucratic support", the scope of bureaucratic support, and "practice", relevant experience. The "bureaucratic support" dimension is coded in the following manner: 0—IO lacks a mandate to engage in this area of conflict management; 1—mandate in treaty or protocol, no specialized institutional support (function is supported via general IO secretariat); 2—mandate in treaty or protocol, specialized institutional support (specialized department or agency with at least 50 staff members). The "practice" dimension is coded in the following manner: 0—IO lacks mandate/never exercised capability; 1—exercised at least once in the last 10 years; 2—exercised at least five times in different countries in the last 10 years. The scores for "bureaucratic support" and "practice" are added up to yield a 0–4 point score for the variable.	Yearly observations for all active IOs, 1946–2010.	Treaties, protocols, administrative decisions, organigrams; Regan et al. (2009), DeRouen et al. (2011).

(continued)

Table A1. Continued

Variable	Type and coding	Range	Sources
Diplomatic interventions authorization	Categorical; 0–4; 0—no rules for authorizing the use of the relevant capability exist or are formalized; 1—unanimity or consensus required for authorization ("Consensus"); 2—majority (simple, qualified, or other) required for authorization ("Majority"); 3—authorization of the capability delegated to a subset of member states ("Council"); 4—authorization of the capability delegated to a supranational entity ("Supranational").	Yearly observations for all active IOs, 1946–2010.	Treaties, protocols.
Economic sanctions capability	Ordered categorical; 0–4; aggregate of "bureaucratic support" and "practice"; see variable *diplomatic intervention capability* for details on coding.	Yearly observations for all active IOs, 1946–2010.	Treaties, protocols, administrative decisions, organigrams.
Economic sanctions authorization	Categorical; 0–4; see variable *diplomatic intervention authorization* for details on coding.	Yearly observations for all active IOs, 1946–2010.	Treaties, protocols.
Field mission capability	Ordered categorical; 0–4; aggregate of "bureaucratic support" and "practice"; see variable *diplomatic intervention capability* for details on coding.	Yearly observations for all active IOs, 1946–2010.	Treaties, protocols, administrative decisions, organigrams; Fortna (2008), Meys (2010).
Field mission authorization	Categorical; 0–4; see variable *diplomatic intervention authorization* for details on coding.	Yearly observations for all active IOs, 1946–2010.	Treaties, protocols.
Collective security	Categorical. 0—No collective security arrangement; 1—collective security arrangement, in which member states commit to cooperate in collectively countering security threats to one or several members.	Yearly observations for all active IOs, 1946–2010.	Treaties.

(continued)

Table A1. Continued

Variable	Type and coding	Range	Sources
Confidence-building measures (CBMs)	Categorical. 0—No CBMs; 1—treaty or protocol specifies that exchange of views, military information exchange, transparency dialogues or other CBMs should take place with regularity.	Yearly observations for all active IOs, 1946–2010. Some missing data.	Protocols, treaties.
Early warning systems	Categorical. 0—No early warning system has been established; 1—early warning system has been established, including bureaucratic support for the provision of analysis and policy guidance of risk factors and emerging crises.	Yearly observations for all active IOs, 1946–2010. Some missing data.	Protocols.
Membership	Categorical; 0 or 1; a state is coded as 1 if a member of an IO in a given year. States identified by COW country codes.	Yearly observations for all states in system for all active IOs, 1946–2010.	COW IGO data (version 2.3) (Pevehouse et al., 2004); IO web pages.
Membership number	Interval; number of states that are members of IO in a given year.	Yearly observations for all active IOs, 1946–2010.	COW IGO data (version 2.3) (Pevehouse et al., 2004); IO web pages.
Power polarity	Interval; 0–1 with higher values representing higher polarity; see text for details on calculation.	Yearly observations for all active IOs, 1946–2007.	Calculated using COW National Material Ca pabilities (version 4.0) (Singer et al., 1972); COW IGO data (version 2.3) (Pevehouse et al., 2004).
Membership power	Interval; 0–1 with higher values representing higher membership power.	Yearly observations for all active IOs, 1946–2007.	Calculated using COW National Material Capabilities (version 4.0) (Singer et al., 1972); COW IGO data (version 2.3) (Pevehouse et al., 2004).